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RYAN WHITE CARE AMENDMENTS:
MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF NEWBORNS
AND A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Catherine H. McCabe*
INTRODUCTION
Women of reproductive age comprise the fastest growing group infected
with HIV in the United States today.' Not surprisingly the incidence of
AIDS has increased among infants who contract the virus perinatally.3
Currently 93 percent of all pediatric AIDS cases arise from vertical
transmission of lIV, in which the lIV-infected mother passes the virus
to her child? This mode of transmission may occur before birth through
intrauterine infection, during delivery of the child, or potentially after
birth via the mother's infected breast milk.4 Responding to this pediatric
AIIS epidemic, state legislatures across the country have proposed
mandatory H[V testing of all newborns and disclosure of lIV test results.
Thus far only one state, New York, has enacted this type of legislation.5
The crisis surrounding liY infected newborns has also attracted the
notice of the federal government, which itself took measures toward
mandating HIV testing of all newborns by enacting the Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Amendments. The
"Stat0 J0URNAL OFHEALT- CARE LAW. BA. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 1994).D.
(Cand.), DePaul University College of Law, 1998.
'Kevin L Cumin, Newborn .- VScreening and Arew YorkAssembly .BillAro. 6747-B: Privaty
andEqualProtection ofPregnant Women, 21 FoRDHAMURB. L. . 857,862 (1994). From 19S5
to 1990, the number of women with AIDS practically doubled and currently, AIDS is the fifth
leading cause of death among women of child-bearing age. These women usually contract HIV
from having sexual intercourse with men who are infected with the virus or using intravenous
drugs with needles that are contaminated.
2 Karen L. Goldstein, Balancing Risks and Rights: I1V TestingRcgimesfor Pregnant Wfomen,
4 CORNELL L L. & PUB. POL'Y 609, 609-10 (1995). See also Cunin, supra note 1, at 863.
Today, approximately 1500 to 2000 11V-infected infants are born each year in the United States
while only 3,199 cases were reported from 1982 to 1991.
3 Cumin, supra note I, at 864.
4 Id
See Cumin, supra note 1. See also Kevin Galvin, Pregnant W omen Targets oflki vliY
Testing Policy: House and Senate Agree to Delay Mewborn Screening While Pushing It in
ExpeetantMothers, S. F. EXAM ,ME, May 1, 1996, atA2.
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CARE Amendments relate to the original CARE Act of 199.0 providing
for allocation of federal funding for HIV and AIDS treatment, as well as
support services to states that adopt HV testing of newborns. All states
that implement programs requiring mandatory non-anonymous HIV
testing will automatically be eligible for these federal funds.6 As
expected, the program has created a great incentive for states to institute
mandatory testing programs.
This article anticipates that the CARE Amendments will create a
scheme of mandatory testing of all pregnant women and newb orns among
the states in order to ensure receipt of federal funds. It is the author's
position, that although the Amendments are notper se unconstitutional,
the CARE amendments are unconstitutional as applied by the states to
HIV testing, since mandatory non-anonymous HIV testing of all newborns
infringes upon each woman's right to privacy.
This article will first explore the political debate between the right of
newborns to treatment versus the right of women to privacy. Second, the
provisions of the CARE Amendments will be discussed. Next, the
impact of the Amendments will be evaluated under both a substantive due
process and an equal protection analysis. Finally, a less intrusive and
more effective alternative solution to pediatric AIDS- will be proposed.
BACKGROUND ON PEDIATRIC AIDS
Between early 1988 and May 1995, in order to track the prevalence of the
HIV virus, the federal government anonymously tested all newborns in
forty-five states for IRV.7 Because the IV virus can be transmitted
directly from an ElV-infected mother to the unborn fetus,' a newborn's
HI V-positive test result is indicative only of the mother's HIV status. In
fact, current methods of testing newborns for HIV involve detecting the
presence of maternal HIV antibodies in the newborns' blood that were
transmitted through the placenta during pregnancy. 9 Consequently, 1IV
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-37 (West Supp. 1991).
7 Galvin, supra note 5, at A2.
" Jean R. Stemlight, MandatoryNon-Anonymous Testing ofNewbornsforHIV ShouldIt Ever
Be Allowed?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. Rnv. 373,376 (1994).
' John M. Naber & David R. Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing Issues in Sitate Newborn
374 [V/ol. 1:373
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testing ofnewborns unavoidably reveals each mother's HV status without
her consent
Due to the revealing nature of newborn blood testing, and pursuant
to guidelines promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), all identif3ing information was removed from
newborn blood samples prior to performance of the HIV tests.
Information pertaining only to the mothers' age, race, and place of
residence was retained." This testing scheme was discontinued in 1995
when Congress proposed identifying blood samples and disclosing test
results to the mothers of the newborns and their physicians."
Congress' proposal to perform mandatory HIV testing on all
newborns was prompted by the results of.a 1994 study published in the
New England Journal ofMedicine.12 The study demonstrated that 1IfV-
positive, pregnant women can reduce the likelihood of passing HIV to
their unborn child13 by taking the drug Zidovudine, commonly kmon as
AZT orZDV.' 4 This antiviral drug inhibits DNA replication of the HIV
virus in the host cell, thereby decreasing the rate at which the HIV-
infected individual's immune system is destroyed.'- The study involved
a sample of pregnant women infected with HIV, 6 one-half of whom were
given the antiviral drug AZT while the other half were given a placebo. 7
The results of the tests demonstrated that 25.5 percent of newborns whose
mothers took the placebo were infected with HIV, whereas only 8.3
percent of newborns whose mothers took AZT were infected.13
Researchers concluded that by providing AZT treatment to pregnant
Sdehingirograms, 71 L. & HEAL H 55,58 (1993).1 Galvin, supra note 5, atA2.
'zJohn Schwartz, AIDS Testing Urged in All Pregnancies; Dng "Brcadithrough" Prompted
Policy Shift, WAsfL Post, July 7,1995, at Al.
13 The AIDS Clinical Trials Group (ACTG) Protocol 076. Howard Minkoff & Ann-
Willoughby, Pediatic ttTVDisese, Zidorudine inPregnane, and Unblinding Hcelslik:Sirv -p:
Reframing the Debate on Prenatal HIV Testing, 274JAMA 1165 (1995).
'
4 Schwartz, supra note 12, at Al.
Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Developments: Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HiV Positive
Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L. L 473, 4S1 (1995).
16 Schwartz, supra note 12, atAl.
'r/a:
'SId
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mothers and their infants, as many as two-thirds of the infants otherwise
infected might avoid contracting EIIlW
Following Congress' proposal to start mandatory H[V testing, a
political debate ensued over whether the rights of newborn children to
treatment were more important than the right of a pregnani woman to
protect her privacy.20 Proponents of unblinded, mandatory HIV testing of
newborns asserted that the purpose of the legislation was to protect public
health, as well as to identify and provide treatment for HIV-positive
newborns?' Supporters further contended that IN transmission would
be prevented by informing women of their HIV-positive status and
encouraging them to refrain from engaging in high risk behaviors, such as
unprotected sexual intercourse or breasifeeding? 2  Additionally,
proponents maintained that early identification of HIV-positive newborns
would afford health care providers the opportunity to provide treatment
for the infected newborns which would most likely both lengthen and
enhance the quality of their lives.'
Opponents of mandatory testing argued that compulsory lIV testing
of newborns and disclosure of the resultant information violates a
woman's constitutional right to privacy since her BIV status is inevitably
revealed. Although the fundamental right to privacy is not set forth
explicitly in the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has
clarified the privacy debate. First in the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court found that the Bill of Rights implies a "penumbra?'
or "zone" of privacy encompassing the right of married individuals to use
contraceptives.24 A few years later in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
recognized the right of privacy as encompassed in the concept of personal
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
19 d
1 Christina Kent, StatesPushedto Test Newbornsfor IV(Reauthorization of 1990 Ryan White
CAREAct), AM. MED. NEWS, May 27, 1996, at 1.
2 Suzane M. Malloy, Mandatory HlVScreening ofNewborns: A Proposition lose Time Has
Not Yet Come, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (1996).
22 1d at 1210.23IdL
24Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Constitution, and found it to include a woman's decision to obtain an
abortion without governmental interference3P
More directly on point is the 1977 case of Whalen v. Roe, where the
Court considered whether an individual's right to privacy concerning
personal information is protected by the Fourteenth Amendmen 25 In
Whalen, the Court employed a balancing approach and upheld a New
York State statute requiring physicians to disclose information regarding
the identification of individuals receiving certain prescription drugs 7
Despite the fact the ihalen Court held the state's interest in gathering
information concerning drug usage outweighed the prescription drug
users' privacy interest, the Court recognized that medical information
pertaining to the physician-patient relationship is included within the right
to privacy?' The Whalen Court, in particular, found at least two types of
privacy interests, "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."29 It is this first strand of privacy
that is implicated by non-anonymous HIV testing programs.
In addition to acknowledging that individuals have a privacy right in
medical records, various federal courts have also concluded that
individuals have a specific right to privacy in nondisclosure of their HIV
or AIDS status. The Second Circuit, for example, recently held in Doe ,.
City of New York that individuals have a fundamental right to privacy
concerning the confidentiality of their IV status. 11 In Doe, the City of
New York disclosed information to the public regarding the settlement of
a discrimination claim against Delta Airlines based on the plaintiff's lIV-
positive status.31 Similarly, in Nolley v. County of Erie, the Western
District Court of New York evaluated the constitutionality of a
correctional facility's policy of labeling HfV-positive inmates'
I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973).
1- Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).27 Id
'
211d See also Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that
patient's medical records are protected by constitutional right to privacy and such information
could not be disclosed during discovery without patient's consent or valid court order).
29Id at 599-600.
30 Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2nd Cir. 1994).
"1 Goldstein, supra note 2, at 632.
1997] 377
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possessions, thereby necessarily revealing their BIV-positive status to
others' 2 The Nolley court invalidated this policy, reasoning that prisoners
have a constitutional right to privacy in unjustified disclosure of their HIV
status.33 Finally, the court in Doe v. City of Cleveland also concluded that
arrestees have a constitutional right to privacy regarding nondisclosure of
AIDS information. 4
An individuals' right to privacy and confidentiality in medical
records, however, is not absolute. Disclosure of information, for
example, may be warranted by public concerns such as developing
treatment programs to control threats to public health. "I A footnote in
Whalen is illustrative of this point, the deciding court stating: "reporting
requirements relating to venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by
deadly weapons, and certifications of fetal death" could be sufficient to
justify disclosure.36 As a result, courts since Whalen have engaged in a
three-way balancing test by weighing the individuals' right to privacy and
confidentiality against the governmental interest in obtaining and utilizing
personal data as well as the societal interest in disclosure of information3 7
This balancing test has since been employed in several significant
decisions. For example, in United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. the
Third Circuit held governmental interest in obtaining information related
to a hazardous work site outweighed any individuals' privacy interests?8
3 2Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
" Id at 729-31. See also Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102 (1). Mass. 1993)
(holding that plaintiffhad constitutional right to privacy including nondisclosure of her HV status
after police officer revealed her HIV-positive status to others upon discovering a. bottle of AZT
in her purse).
14 Doev. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
1s United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3rd Cir. 1980).
36 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.29 (1977).
31 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3rd Cir. 1980).
3 M The federal government ordered an employer to produce its employees' medical records
under a subpoena duces tecum through the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) in
order to investigate a potentially hazardous work area. The Westinghouse court considered the
following seven factors in balancing these competing interests: (1) "the type of recrd requested;"
(2) "the information it does or might contain;" (3) "the potential for harm in ny subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure;" (4) "the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record
was generated;" (5) "the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure;" (6) "the
degree of need for access;" and (7) "whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access."
378 [Vol. 1:373
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Likewise in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 39 the Supreme Court
used the balancing test to conclude that the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act did not impermissibly infringe upon President
Nixon's privacy interests. The Nixon Court found the former President's
privacy interest in his personal communications was outveighed by the
public interest in subjecting the materials to arehival screening4 Finally,
in United States Dep 't ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, the Supreme Court balanced the public interest in disclosure of
information against the individual's privacy interesO In this case, the
Court held disclosure of the contents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) criminal identification records to a third party
constituted unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom
of Information Act.42
The controversy over a woman's right to privacy, versus a newborns'
right to treatment, can be evaluated under a similar balancing test by
weighing the interest of women in nondisclosure of their M-EV status
against governmental interest in protecting public health and providing
treatment to HEV-positive newborns. Upon consideration of these
competing interests, the House still chose to pass the bill requiring
mandatory testing of all newborns, and the Senate also recommended
expansion of voluntary testing and counseling for pregnant women43 In
an attempt to compromise with both the House and the Senate, positions
Congress reauthorized the Ryan White CARE Act.r
39 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
"' Ka The Supreme Court reached this conclusion based upon facts including the limited
intrusion of the screening process, the President's status as a public figure, the President's lack
of expectation of privacy in the materials, and the need for comprehensive screening.4 1 United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Committee forFreedom ofthe Pess, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).
4 2 Id
43 Kent, supra note 20, at 1.
44Id
1997] 379
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THE RYAN WHITE CARE ACT
The Ryan White CARE Act of 19904s provides grants to assist states,
cities, and hospitals in offering treatment and support services for
individuals infected with HIV and those suffering from AIDS.4 6
Reauthorization of the Act will allocate $738 million in 1997, an increase
from $632 million allocated last year.47 Under the CARE Amendments,
states which demonstrate they have adopted the CDC guidelines regarding
EIV counseling and voluntary testing for pregnant women will be eligible
for federal funding. 8
In order to assist states in meeting the CDC's guidelines, the
Amendments provide that $10 million will be available each year from
1996 through the year 2000, with priority given to states demonstrating
the highest rates of IRV infection among pregnant women. 9 Specifically,
funding will be provided to the states for the following purposes:
(1) HIV counseling for pregnant women;
(2) prenatal care for pregnant women at high risk of contracting MIV;
(3) voluntary HIV testing for pregnant women;
45 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff(%Vest Supp. 1991). "The purpose of the Act is to provide emergency
assistance to localities that are disproportionately affected by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
epidemic and to make financial assistance availableto States and other public or private nonprofit
entities to provide for the development; organization, coordination and operation of more effective
and cost efficient systems for the delivery of essential services to individuals and families with
HIV disease."
" See, John Boehner, Ryan White CAREAct Amendments-Conference Report, Gov't Press
Releases, RE'L DOCUMENT CLEAwNGHOUS, INc., May 1, 1996. The Act was named in honor
of a hemophiliac boy who acquired HIV through a blood transfusion at the age of 12; See also
Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert, HIV Infection Among Women and Children and
Anitdiscrimination Laws: An Overview, 77 IOWAL. REV. 1313, 1321 &1388 n.33 (1992). Ryan
was subsequently prohibited from attending seventh grade at a public school in his hometown of
Kokomo, Indiana. Until his death at age eighteen in 1990, he and his family successfully fought
for AIDS awareness, contributing to public understanding of and compassion for individuals living
with HIV and AIDS.47 Curt Anderson, Ryan White Bill Compromise Means More AIDS Dollarsfir Rural Areas,
AssociATED PREsS PoL. SERV., May 1, 1996.
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-33(a), (b) (West Supp. 1991).
49 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-33(c)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1991). Rates would be determined by CDC
statistics.
380 [Vol. 1:373
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(4) costs incurred while attempting to meet CDC guidelines and/or
implementing mandatory HV testing of newborns.51
As a prerequisite to funding, states must determine on a yearly basis
the prevalence of perinatal AIDS transmission within their state51
Additionally, states are required to evaluate the possible causes of
perinatal transmission including:12
(1) failure of current prenatal HIV counseling and testing programs to
meet the guidelines issued by the CDC;
(2) unavailable or inaccessible treatment programs; or
(3) the refusal of pregnant women to undergo treatment 1
Pursuant to the CARE Amendments, in September 1998 the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) will assess whether
non-anonymous mandatory HIV testing of newborns has become a
common practice among the states.54 The HIV testing scheme entails
disclosure of test results to the newborns' biological mothers (or legal
guardians) and the newborns' health care providers5 In addition to
testing newborns, the CARE Amendments provide that prenatal test
results will also be revealed to the pregnant woman and her physician.5
In either case, the Amendments require that the mother then be pro-ided
with HIV counseling.5
Once mandatory HIV testing has become a routine practice, as
determined by the Secretary, each state vill then be required to
demonstrate attainment of one of the following three goals by March of
2000:5s
so42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-33(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
5142 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34(a) (West Supp. 1991).
n 42 U.S.C-A § 300ff-34(b) (West Supp. 1991).53id
5 Kent, supra note 20, at 1.
55 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-35(2) (West Supp. 1991).
.6 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-35(3) (West Supp. 1991).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-35(4) (West Supp. 1991).59 d
1997]
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(1) a 50 percent reduction in the rate of new cases of AIDS as a result of
perinatal transmission as compared to the rate of such cases reported
in 1993;59
(2) HIV testing of at least 95 percent of women in the state who have
received at least two prenatal visits prior to thirty-four weeks
gestation with a health care provider or provider group;6 or
(3) mandatory HIV testing of all newborns whose mothers have not
undergone prenatal HIV testing, and disclosure of the resultant
information." If a state does not reach one of the above goals, it
must institute a program equivalent to the third goal requiring
mandatory HIV testing of all newborns, or otherwise forfeit funding
provided under the Amendments. 62
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CARE
AMENDMENTS
When assessing the constitutionality of public health statutes, in this case
the Ryan White CARE Amendments, courts review under a presumption
of validity. However, public health statutes that infringe upon a
fundamental right, however, are more likely to be invalidated. 63 Under
a substantive due process analysis, strict judicial scrutiny must be applied
to the Amendments, since they interfere with a fundamental right to
privacy, namely "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters."' According to this heightened standard of review, a statute may
be upheld only if found necessary to attain a compelling governmental
interests.6' Moreover, the means of attaining this interest must be
59 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34(e)(A) (West Supp. 1991). Since reported AIDS cases were readily
available, these statistics were used to estimate the prevalence of HIV-infected infants, although
states could rely on available IV data instead. States with less than ten caces would use a
comparable measure.
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34(e)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
61 Kent supra note 20, at 1.
62 Id
I Curnin, supra note 1, at 875
1 Michael Closen, Robert Gamrath, & Dem Hopkins, Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing:
Political Exploitation ofthe ALDSEpidemic, 69 TUL. L. REv. 71, 102 (1994).
6IdL
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narrowly tailored and constitute the least restrictive mode of achieving the
stated goals."
Prior case law offers some guidance, but little certainty, on this
privacy issue. For example, although the IW7alen Court found
governmental interest in information pertaining to prescription drug usage
outweighed an individuals' right to privacy, revealing a pregnant
woman's HV status has potentially more harmful consequences.
Furthermore, HIV testing cannot be fairly characterized as "routine" and,
thus, is not analogous to the records at issue in Westinghouse, which
pertained to routine tests such as "X-rays, blood tests, pulmonary function
tests, [and] hearing and visual tests."67 Non-anonymous HIV testing is
clearly distinguishable from both prescription drug identification and
routine tests due to the likelihood of discrimination and stigmatization;
consequently, a pregnant woman's HIV status should be afforded greater
protection and should not be made public information by the government.
A similar conclusion was reached by the court in Hmaii Psychiatic
Soc"y v. Ariyoshi, which similarly distinguished Whalen'5 holding that
disclosure of patients' files and psychological profiles violated patients'
rights to privacy.69 The Ariyoshi court found, unlike the Whalen court,
that the type of information at issue had a unique personal character and
involved "most intimate thoughts and emotions, as well as descriptions
of conduct that may be embarrassing or illegal." '70 Likewise, a woman's
LIV status is unique as compared to other personal information, because
AIDS is distinguished from other diseases by its incurable nature, the
means of infection, and fear and stigma associated with the disease.
Notwithstanding the important governmental interest in protecting
public health and providing treatment for HIV-positive newborns, the
CARE Amendments are still unconstitutional in light of the severe
consequences - violating all women's right to privacy. Several factors
demonstrate that mandatory BIV testing legislation is not sufficiently
6 Id.
17 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3rd Cir. 1980).
I See generally Hawaii Psychiatrie Soe'y v. Ariyoshi, 4S1 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii, 1979).
69 Md
73 Id
19971 383
DEPAUL JOURNAL oF HEALTH CARE LAWV
narrowly tailored to attain the purported goals of a substantive due process
analysis including:
(1) The Amendments may cause discrimination and avoidance of
prenatal care;
(2) the uncertainty of HV test results; and
(3) disputable benefits of HIV treatment programs.
Discrimination and Stigmatization of Mothers and Newborns
HIV-positive test results will undoubtedly subject mothers and newborns
to stigmatization and discrimination by the general population. It is well
known that victims of IV and AIDS continue to be negatively
stereotyped and stigmatized, 71 primarily due to the fact that EIV and
AIDS were initially more prevalent among unfavored segments of the
population, including homosexuals, intravenous drug addicts, prostitutes,
promiscuous individuals, and indigent minority groups.7 1 Current
statistics indicate that more than 70 percent of women with AIDS are
African-American or LatinaP and, therefore, targeting these minority
women who are concentrated mostly in poverty-stricken inner cities,
would further contribute to discrimination against these woraen.
The stigmatization associated with HIV and AIDS may adso result in
loss of employment opportunities for infected individuals, housing
availability, and the support of friends and family.74 The disclosure of an
MIV-positive test result could cause individuals to lose health insurance
coverage75 even though the CARE Amendments explicity prohibits
insurers from discontinuing policies based on NIV status76 However, the
71 id. at83.
7 Id. See also Closen, Gamrath & Hopkins, supra note 65, at 84. Some individuals further
contribute to the stigmatization of individuals suffering from HIV and/or AIDS by broadcasting
theirtheory thatHIV and AIDS are aform ofGod's retribution on individuals engaging in "sinful"
behaviors, which they contend includes homosexuality, substance abuse, prostitution, and
adultery/pre-marital sex.
7' Taunya Lovell Banks, Women andAIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, :17 N.B. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 351, 351 (1990).
7 Closen et al., supra note 64, at 104.
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-35(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
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exception is if individuals misrepresent their lILV status when applying
for health insurance." In any event, insurance companies are still able
to discontinue coverage simply by offering another reason for no longer
insuring the IV-positive patients 3 and, more surprisingly, insurers may
still be entitled to alter the terms of IV-positive individuals' insurance
plans. 9 Finally, in addition to social and institutional discrimination, it is
likely that IV-positive newborns may be abandoned by their mothers,
thereby causing the infants to suffer additional discrimination in the
context of adoption and foster homes'
The potential stigma and discrimination against individuals living
with IV or AIDS may further provide incentive for pregnant women to
avoid prenatal care altogether, thereby contravening the purpose of the
CARE legislation. Additionally, when a pregnant woman realizes that
HIV testing is a prerequisite to hospital admission, she may choose to
have her baby delivered elsewhere under unsafe conditions, particularly
if she is at high risk for IV infection."
Proponents of CARE legislation argue that any infringement upon
a woman's right to privacy in non-anonymous testing is minimal, and that
societal discrimination is unlikely since the results of the IV tests are
revealed only to the newborn's mother, the physician, and the
govemment.8 However, this argument fails to take into account the fact
that dissemination of confidential medical information occurs frequently: 3
Moreover, mothers who seek treatment for their infants or themselves,
would most likely not be able to hide their EIfV-positive status84
77 42 U.S.C.A § 300ff-35(5)XB) (West Supp. 1991).
79 Id
79 42U.S.CA § 300ff-35(5)(C) (West Supp. 1991). TheActprovides that"subpargraph (A)
does not apply to any reasonable alteration in the terms of health insurance for an individual with
HIV disease that would have been made if the individual had a serious dkease other than IEV
disease."
FO Martha A. Field, Pregnancy andAIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402,429 (1993).
It Id at 422.
2 Cumin, supra note 1, at 876.
3 Id. at 877.
94 Id. at 877-78.
1997] 5
DEPAUL JouRNAL op HEALTH CARE LAW
Inaccuracy of HBV Test Results
Second, the CARE Amendments are not narrowly tailored enough, since
the legislation presumes highly accurate H[V test results even though only
25 percent of infants who test positive for IRV are found to be actually
infected."5 The rest of the infants "seroconvert" or shed their mothers'
EiV antibodies, while their own bodies produce none. 6 During this
window period that lasts approximately twelve months, the "true" MIV-
positive infants are indistinguishable from the "false" lIV-positive
infants. An BIV-positive test result, however, is definitively indicative
of the mothers' HIV-positive status8 7
HIV test results can also be inaccurate as a result of errors that may
occur at any point during the testing process. Testing materials
themselves may be faulty8" and HIV test results can also be inaccurate if
laboratory technicians' fail to follow a sound two-part testing procedure.
The first part of the testing procedure involves an enzyme-linked
immunoabsorbent assay (ELISA) test, an overly sensitive test that
reduces a large quantity of blood samples to a smaller number of
potentially HIV-infected samples.8 9 After the initial ELISA s.reening, the
more expensive and less sensitive Western Blot test is conducted. 9° Only
when both of these tests are performed correctly does the accuracy of
detecting the"true" HfIV-contaminated blood samples exceed 99 percent.91
The ELISA test alone, however, will also detect false positives and
individuals will likely be informed incorrectly that they have tested I-IV-
positive.92
'5Id at. 865.
"Id at 865.
7 in L Cumin, Newborn IlVScreening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy
and Equal Protection ofPregnant Women, 21 FORDHAIURB L. J. 857,865 (1994).
83Closen, et al., supra note 65, at 91.
Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure ofIVBlood Test Results to the Individuals Tested:
A Matter ofPersonal Choice Neglected, 22 LOY. U. CmI. L. . 445, 449 (1991).
9o Id
9' Closen et al., supra note 64, at 91.
1 Closen, supra note 89, at 449.
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Debatable Benefit Of Treatment Programs
The benefits oftreatment programs are debatable, largely because the IIV
tests employed today render immediate treatment of HEV-positive
newborns impractical. Because infection manifests quickly in newborns,
treatment must be immediate to be effective 3 Under current procedures,
several weeks may lapse before laboratory test results are available; and
an additional period of time, possibly lasting several months, may pass
while efforts are made to contact the newborns' mother or guardian. 4
Additionally, an EIV-positive woman could unknowingly infect her
newborn infant through breastfeeding after being discharged from the
hospital when test results are not yet available. 5
The effectiveness of antiviral drugs is also quite limited since the
drugs only decrease the rate at which 1IfV replicates, rather than
destroying the virus or terminating DNA replication altogether. 5 Patients
may also develop immunity to the drugs, necessarily reducing the drugs'
effectiveness, and often require physicians to alternate treatment among
different antiviral drugs.97 Long-term side effects of antiviral drugs are
not yet known, but these drugs are often accompanied by a variety of
intolerable side effects including anemia, peripheral neuropathy, and
headaches?8 Side effects are ofparticular concern for three-quarters ofthe
HMV-positive infants who will derive no benefit from treatment since they
eventually shed their mothers' antibodies eventually? For this reason,
many physicians refiain from treating HJV-positive newborns based solely
on an MV-positive test result."' In fact, many physicians wait until the
MiV-positive test results are corroborated by symptoms of infection or an
I Cumin, supra note 1, at 888.
94 Id
s Ia at 890. The results of medical studies concerning transmission from mother to infant
through breast milk are inconclusive. An occurrence of this type of bmission w'as first
documented in Australia in 1985 and over a period of five years. Only eight cazes were reported
thereafter.
" Grizzi, supra note 15, at 481.
97 1d. at 482.53Id
99 Curnin, supra note 1, at 889.
"I Naber & Johnson, supra note 9, at 62.
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extremely low CD4 lymphocyte count before treating the newborn with
any antiviral drugs at all. °I
CARE Amendments Violate Privacy Rights
In light of the stigmatization and discrimination associated with HIV and
AIDS, the danger that pregnant women will avoid prenatal care, the
inaccuracy of test results, and the questionable benefits of current
treatment programs, legislation requiring non-anonymous HEV testing of
all newborns is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Therefore, the
Amendments are violative of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
When a statutory classification impacts a fundamental right (in this
instance, the right to privacy), the identical strict scrutiny test discussed
above for substantive due process is applied under an equal protection
analysis, regardless ofwhether the classification itself is "suspect." Under
a strict scrutiny standard, a statutory classification wiin be upheld only if
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest. By requiring IV testing of all newborns, the CARE
Amendments necessarily impose HIV testing on all women who give
birth, resulting in creation of a class based on gender. Accordingly, in
order to prevail on an equal protection challenge based on sex
discrimination, opponents of the CARE legislation must demonstrate
purposeful and deliberate legislative discrimination, rather than merely a
discriminatory effect. 10 2
, Cumin, supra note 1, at 890.
11 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding purposeful discrimination must be
proven before an equal protection racial discrimination claim will prevail, although racial impact
may be taken into account in ascertaining intent). See also Personnel Admin'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding the state's preference for veterans in civil service positions
was not violative of equal protection despite the fact that over 98 percent of the Massachusetts
veterans were men since a significant number ofmale non-veterans were also afferted. The Court
stated the statute would not be deemed unconstitutional unless it was demonstrated that the
legislature acted because of'and not merely "in spite of," the discriminatory effect on women).
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Purposeful discrimination, may be proven in three ways:
(1) by demonstrating the statute is discriminatory according to its
explicit terms;10 3
(2) by showing the statute, although neutral on its face, is administered
in a discriminatory manner, 4 or
(3) by demonstrating the statute, although neutral on its face and as
applied, was originally enacted with a discriminatory purpose as
shown by circumstantial evidence such as legislative history,
legislators' statements, or discriminatory impact.15
Notwithstanding the fact that the mandatory HIV testing scheme is
facially neutral since all newborns are tested,"'5 the Amendments are
discriminatory in their implementation because they discriminate based on
gender. This is true because HIV testing of newborns only reveals the
mother's HIV status and not the father's. Even assuming arguendo that
the legislation is neutral on its face and as applied, the legislation
inevitably constitutes invidious gender discrimination in consideration of
circumstantial evidence. For instance, women have been politically,
economically, and socially discriminated against in the past.1 7 Further,
as long as reproductive differences, which are immutable characteristics
and unrelated to an individual's ability to contribute to society, are not
recognized as falling under the Equal Protection Clause, a woman's
11 SeeStrauderv. West, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding thata statute stating that "all white male
persons who are twenty-one years of age who are citizens of this State shall be eligible to serve
as jurorsP was facially discriminatory against Aftican-Americans and thus, unconstitutional under
-the Equal Protection ).
SSee Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a facially neutral ordinance was
violative of equal protection when permits issued pursuant to the statute were given to all exccpt
one non-Chinese applicant while none were issued to nearly 200 Chinese applicants).
11 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that although the voting system of
electing the Board of Commissioners was facially neutral and not originally enacted for a
discriminatory purpose, the statute was violative of equal protection since it was maintained by
the state legislature for discriminatory purposes and had a discriminatory impact on the African-
American citizens).
"0 Linda Farber Post, Unblinded MandatoryHlVS'creening ofAferwborns: Care or Coercion?,
16 CA.uozo L. REv. 169,219 (1994).
" 
7Joelle S. Weiss, Controllingll'-Positive Women's Procreativ, Destiny. A Crllical Equal
Protection.Analyskf, 2 SErONI-AIL CONST. L. .642,711 (1992).
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procreative capacity will continue to be exploited, thereby encouraging
and justifying male supremacy.'
At least one Supreme Court decision appears to be an obstacle to
such an equal protection challenge. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 9 the Court
found a state insurance system that denied coverage for certain pregnancy-
related disabilities did not constitute gender discrimination in -violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Although
Geduldig has rarely been relied upon as precedent,"' the few cases that
have followed it have narrowly construed its holding, such as in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 112 where Geduldig was cited for the
proposition that distinctions based on pregnancy did not constitute ipso
facto gender classifications.
Numerous other cases have echoed similar finding to Geduldig. In
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, for example, the Supreme Court found an
employer's disability benefits plan was not violative of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and did not constitute gender discrimination,
even though the plan did not cover pregnancy-related disabilities.1 3
Additionally, in Weinberger v. Salfi the Supreme Court held a Social
Security Act provision was constitutional even though the provision
denied insurance benefits to surviving wives and stepchildren whose
familial relationship with deceased wage earner was less than nine
months."14
However, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have ever
expressly held that pregnancy discrimination can never constitute gender
discrimination." 5 As long as the Geduldig holding is interpreted as
permitting men and women to be treated differently based on women's
reproductive capacity, women will never be afforded equal protection
under the law since only similarly situated individuals are entitled to such
1031Iad at 713-14.
'
09 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
"
0 l
1id1
"I Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. _ (1976) (holding that antiabortion
protesters did not invidiously discriminate against women in general).
"I General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
14 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
"I Cumin, supra note 1, at 910.
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constitutional guarantees." 6 Thus, it would be a significant decision for
programs requiring non-anonymous HIV testing of newborns to be
invalidated, since these programs discriminate based on gender.
Strict scrutiny under equal protection of the CARE Amendments
demonstrates that lIIV testing is not necessary to serve any compelling
governmental interests. Taking into account the previous discussion
pertaining to the discrimination and stigma associated with HIV and
AIDS, the potential avoidance of prenatal care, the inaccuracy of test
results and the debatable benefits of treatment programs, the Amendments
are clearly an unjustified infringement upon a pregnant woman's right to
privacy.
In addition to due process and equal protection violations, non-
anonymous HIV testing of newborns necessarily reveals the IV status of
their mothers. This revelation could lead to questions concerning the
"fitness" of HIV-infected women for marriage and parenthood, potentially
resulting in such drastic measures as mandatory lIlV testing of all women,
criminalization of the transmission of HIV from mother to fetus, coerced
abortions, or compulsory sterilizations." 7 Possible adverse consequences
of the Amendments are even more pronounced upon consideration of the
"slippery slope," potentially leading to mandatory testing for a variety of
other conditions and traits detectable from blood samples." 3
AN ALTERNATIVE TO MANDATORY TESTING
The potential constitutional and logistical complications posed by the
CARE Amendments can be completely avoided because the Amendments
are not necessary to control the pediatric AIDS crisis. In fact, far less
drastic measures are available.
One alternative is to repeal the provision making federal funding
contingent upon whether the states achieve at least one of the three goals
specified in the Act. Instead, voluntary, anonymous testing should be
encouraged, and there should be additional focus on education and pre-
and post-natal counseling specific to HIV and AIDS. This alternative
"' Weiss, supra note 108, at 700.
1'
7Id at 660.
'i Field, supra note 80, at 435.
1997]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
scheme to mandatory testing is more likely to succeed since women who
choose to be tested for HIV are more apt to seek follow-up care and to
make the behavioral changes recommended by their health care
providers.119
Since physicians today are inadequately prepared to provide HIV
counseling, specially trained IV counselors should be made available"2
to provide pregnant women with written materials and/or videos
explaining the nature of HIV. In addition, these counselors could explain
to patients how the virus is transmitted, help interpret test :results, and
provide information on available treatment programs and reproductive
options.121 Further, any education and counseling provided should be
tailored toward individual needs, and be based upon eaeii woman's
individual education level as well as her cultural and linguistic
backgrounds." The focus of the counseling should be on prevention, the
benefits of HIV testing, and the availability of support services. 123
Education and counseling have already proven effective, as
demonstrated by the increasing number of women who agree to voluntary
testing and by the decreasing incidence of HIV infection. The New York
State Health Department, for instance, recently reported that 85 to 91
percent of women who were provided with education and counseling
chose to test voluntarily for HIV.2 4  Additionally, s.-veral gay
communities have documented a decrease in the incidence of new HIV
cases, which has been attributed to the effectiveness of recently
implemented educational programs.'21
CONCLUSION
The Ryan White CARE Amendments will ultimately coerce states to
adopt mandatory, non-anonymous HlV testing statutes in am effort to
prevent the state's loss of federal funding. Consequently, any effort to
n9 Curnin, supra note 1, at 894.
120 Ram Yogev, Prenatal Testing Can Curb AIDS in Children, C. TRIB., July 28, 1996, at 6.
121 led
2 Post, supra note 106, at 122.
123 Id.
1 4 Malloy, supra note 21, at 1213.
1 Closen et al., supra note 64, at 90.
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comply with the guidelines pursuant to the Act will result in unnecessary
infringement upon the individual privacy rights of all women. Since other
less intrusive and more effective means of addressing the pediatric AIDS
epidemic are available, mandatory HIV testing of newborns is violative
of the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution and should be discontinued.

